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Abstract: Declarative memory is remarkably adaptive in the way it maintains sensitivity to relative
novelty in both unknown and highly familiar environments. However, the neural mechanisms under-
lying this contextual adaptation are poorly understood. On the basis of emerging links between nov-
elty processing and reinforcement learning mechanisms, we hypothesized that responses to novelty
will be adaptively scaled according to expected contextual probabilities of new and familiar events, in
the same way that responses to prediction errors for rewards are scaled according to their expected
range. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we show that the inﬂuence of novelty
and reward on memory formation in an incidental memory task is adaptively scaled and furthermore
that the BOLD signal in orbital prefrontal and medial temporal cortices exhibits concomitant scaled
adaptive coding. These ﬁndings demonstrate a new mechanism for adjusting gain and sensitivity in
declarative memory in accordance with contextual probabilities and expectancies of future events.
Hum Brain Mapp 31:1380–1394, 2010. V C 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Novelty is a fundamental signal associated with attract-
ing attention, promoting memory encoding and modifying
goal-directed behavior [Knight, 1996; Lisman and Grace,
2005; Mesulam, 1998; Sokolov, 1963]. The inﬂuential ‘‘nov-
elty encoding hypothesis’’ [Tulving et al., 1996] suggests
that there is a direct relationship between the probability
of long-term encoding of information and its degree of
novelty. How the novelty of information is quantiﬁed in
terms of a neural encoding signal and to what extent this
is separable from the neural representation of familiarity
are not fully understood.
There are at least three different sets of results on the
coding and effects of novelty. First, neural responses to
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V C 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.stimuli are widely observed to decrease monotonically
with the number of previous exposures, as in repetition
suppression [Desimone, 1996; Miller and Desimone, 1994].
This provides an ‘‘absolute’’ signal of novelty. Second, dur-
ing tasks involving old/new discrimination, there are ‘‘bi-
nary’’ neural responses that do not discriminate different
levels of familiarity, but simply old from new [Johnson
et al., 2008]. Furthermore, binary and absolute signals lie
in close anatomical proximity in the hippocampus. Finally,
it is very well established that neural novelty responses
are modiﬁed by the likelihood of expected occurrences of
new events in a given context [e.g., Chong et al., 2008;
Duzel and Heinze, 2002; Knight, 1996; Lisman and Grace,
2005; Schott et al., 2005; Yamaguchi et al., 2004; for a
review, see Lisman and Grace [2005]]. However, the na-
ture of these modiﬁcations is incompletely understood. In
particular, it is unclear whether any of these signals modu-
late how much is encoded about stimuli in different envi-
ronments and how such a modulation could be achieved
(see also Brown and Xiang [1998] and Yonelinas et al.
[2005]).
Here, we address the critical questions as to how the
magnitude of neural novelty responses and the behav-
ioral impact on incidental memory is scaled in contexts
with different expected probabilities of new and familiar
events and the extent to which this scaling coexists with
an absolute representation of the familiarity status of
stimuli. We hypothesized that, as for prediction error
signals for reward [Tobler et al., 2005], novelty signals
would be scaled according to contextual probabilities
and also according to predictions regarding the relative
novelty and familiarity of items that need to be explic-
itly discriminated in memory. This hypothesis, which
sits comfortably with the theoretical suggestion that nov-
elty acts to motivate exploration of the environment to
harvest rewards [Kakade and Dayan, 2002], arises out of
converging evidence from human and nonhuman pri-
mate studies that point to shared properties of novelty
and reward.
In anatomical terms, the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus,
and substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA)
have all been implicated in both novelty processing and
certain forms of reinforcement learning [Duzel et al., 2009;
Lisman and Grace, 2005; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Montague
et al., 2004; Schultz, 1998, 2006]. For example, the human
SN/VTA is activated by actual reward [Knutson and
Cooper, 2005] and novelty [Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Bun-
zeck et al., 2007; Wittmann et al., 2005], as well as by cues
predicting their occurrence [Knutson and Cooper, 2005;
O’Doherty et al., 2002; Wittmann et al., 2005, 2007]. A
recent network model of dopaminergic modulation of hip-
pocampal plasticity for novel events, termed the hippo-
campal-VTA loop model [Lisman and Grace, 2005],
proposes that novelty signals are conveyed from the hip-
pocampus to the SN/VTA through mesolimbic circuitry
including the ventral striatum and ventral pallidum. This
novelty signal is integrated with information from prefron-
tal cortex to elicit SN/VTA activation in response to nov-
elty, with ensuing release of dopamine (DA) in the
hippocampus.
By contrast with novelty responses, much is known
about contextual adaptation of neural responses associated
with reward magnitude. One, by now conventional, form
of adaptation is seen in the ﬁring rates of midbrain DA
neurons, which encode a temporally sophisticated predic-
tion error for the delivery of reward [Montague et al.,
2004; Schultz, 1998]. Thus, in a context in which there are
two equally probable rewarding outcomes, delivery of the
lower reward will cause below-baseline activity, whereas
delivery of the higher reward leads to an increase in ﬁring.
The second form of adaptation (which we call adaptive
scaling) is less conventional, with increases and decreases
in neural ﬁring above and below baseline remaining con-
stant across a range of actual differences between the
quantities of predicted and actual reward [Tobler et al.,
2005]. Adaptive scaling involves the SN/VTA DA system
adjusting its gain and sensitivity in accordance with con-
textual expectations.
On the basis of the commonalities between the func-
tional architectures of reward and novelty, we conjectured
that the same two forms of neural adaptation seen for
reward may also characterize novelty. As for rewards,
adaptive scaling of novelty should occur under explicit
task instructions, that is when novelty assessment is
required and the novelty status of stimuli is not incidental
to the current task goal (e.g., see Bunzeck and Duzel
[2006]). While adaptive scaling of rewards has been sug-
gested as allowing efﬁcient coding of appetitive prediction
errors [Barlow, 1961], we suggest that adaptive scaling of
novelty arranges for efﬁcient encoding into long-term
memory of information, perhaps via the inﬂuence on long-
term plasticity of DA release in the hippocampus [Frey
and Morris, 1998; Morris, 2006; O’Carroll et al., 2006].
Adaptive scaling of novelty would have the critical
advantage over absolute coding of preventing memory
capacity from being overwhelmed in novel environments
(by comparatively reducing gain and/or sensitivity), while
allowing efﬁcient memory updating in familiar environ-
ments (by enhancing gain and sensitivity). As such, adapt-
ive scaling is a generalization and modiﬁcation of the
‘‘novelty encoding hypothesis’’ [Tulving et al., 1996]
according to which new items are preferentially encoded
over familiar items [Tulving and Kroll, 1995]. To put it
another way, rather than being an algorithmic question of
mere efﬁcient coding of a signal to optimize the use of a
limited bandwidth channel, adaptively scaled novelty
responses could be part of a computationally sophisticated
process ensuring efﬁcient encoding of stimuli into
memory.
To test the hypothesis that novelty and reward both
express contextual adaptive scaling, we conducted two
fMRI studies in healthy young adults using an adaptive
reward coding paradigm adapted from a study in nonhu-
man primates [Tobler et al., 2005]. The ﬁrst fMRI study
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humans; the second was designed to assess whether nov-
elty is also scaled adaptively under the same experimental
conditions. We reasoned that adaptive scaling of novelty
and reward should share components of the hippocampal-
SN/VTA loop and extracted these common anatomical
elements through a direct comparison of both fMRI stud-
ies. Finally, we assessed whether under conditions in
which reward magnitude is scaled adaptively, long-term
memory for novel events is likewise modulated adap-
tively. This ﬁnding would directly link adaptive scaling to
long-term plasticity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
None of the tested participants reported a history of
neurological, psychiatric, or medical disorders or any cur-
rent medical problems. All experiments were run with
each subject’s written informed consent and according to
the local ethics clearance (University College London,
United Kingdom).
Experiment I
Subjects
Fourteen healthy right-handed adults (age range 19–32
years; mean ¼ 24.9 years; SD ¼ 3.95 years; seven males
and seven females) with normal or corrected-to-normal
acuity were recruited for paid participation.
Experimental design and task
Four 8-min blocks of a reward prediction paradigm were
completed. Here, one of three possible cues (colored
squares) appeared for 500 ms, informing the subjects which
of two reward values could potentially follow. One cue pre-
dicted a high reward (£1) or a medium reward (£0.50); a
second cue predicted a medium (£0.50) or a low reward
(£0.15); and a third cue predicted a high (£1) or a low
reward (£0.15) (Fig. 1A). One of the two possible reward
values was presented with equal probability (50:50) 1,625–
4,875 ms after the cue followed by a response/ﬁxation
period for 3,250–6,500 ms (Fig. 1B). Using their index or
middle ﬁnger the subjects indicated whether they saw the
higher or the lower of the two possible reward values (the
ﬁnger, which had to be used to indicate the higher or lower
reward and the color coding of the reward cues, were coun-
terbalanced across subjects). The order of the stimuli and
the timing (intertrial interval and interstimulus interval)
were optimized for event-related fMRI allowing the hemo-
dynamic responses for cues and outcome to be differenti-
ated [Hinrichs et al., 2000].
Prior to the experiment, the subjects were instructed to
respond as quickly and as correctly as possible and were
told that only correct responses would lead to the reward.
After the experiment, the volunteers were paid 10% of all
earnings, which could be a maximum of £16. Feedback as
to correct responses was given after the completion of the
entire experiment, but not on a trial-by-trial basis.
Experiment II
Subjects
Sixteen healthy right-handed adults (age range 19–33
years; mean ¼ 23.63 years; SD ¼ 4.22; seven males and
nine females) with normal or corrected-to-normal acuity
were recruited for paid participation.
Experimental design and task
This behavioral experiment was a modiﬁed version of
Experiment I, run in front of a computer. One second after
the reward a scene picture was presented, and subjects
additionally had to discriminate its indoor/outdoor status
(Fig. 1C). To maximize stimulus reward associations, and
since fMRI was not being used, the timing between cue,
reward, and picture was ﬁxed. The subjects were told that
they would receive the reward only if both decisions
(higher vs. lower possible reward and indoor vs. outdoor)
were made correctly.
One day later, the subjects performed an incidental rec-
ognition memory test following the ‘‘remember/know’’
procedure [Tulving, 1985]. Here, the 288 previously seen
pictures (48 pictures per category) were presented together
with 48 new distracter pictures at the center of the screen,
in random order. The subject ﬁrst made an ‘‘old/new’’ de-
cision to each individually presented picture using their
right index or middle ﬁnger. Following a ‘‘new’’ decision,
subjects were prompted to indicate whether they were
conﬁdent (‘‘certainly new’’) or unsure (‘‘guess’’), again
using their right index and middle ﬁnger. After an ‘‘old’’
decision, subjects were prompted to indicate if they were
able to remember something speciﬁc about seeing the
scene at study (‘‘remember response’’), just felt familiarity
with the picture without any recollective experience (‘‘fa-
miliar’’ response), or were merely guessing that the picture
was an old one (‘‘guess’’ response). The subject had 4 s to
make each of both judgments, and there was a break of 15
s after every 84 pictures.
Experiment III
Subjects
Fourteen healthy right-handed adults (age range 19–39
years; mean ¼ 26.1 years; SD ¼ 5.7 years; nine females
and ﬁve males) with normal or corrected-to-normal acuity
were recruited for paid participation.
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Experimental designs. One of three possible cues (colored
squares) indicated either which of two possible reward values
(Experiments I and II) (A, C) or which of two possible degrees of
novelty associated with a scene picture (Experiment III) (D, E)
could follow with equal probability. Following the reward (Experi-
ments I and II) (A–C) or scene picture (Experiment III) (D, E) sub-
jects indicated whether they saw the higher or the lower of the
two possible reward values (Experiments I and II), or the contex-
tually more novel or familiar of two possible images (Experiment
III). Additionally, in Experiment II, the reward value was followed
by a novel scene picture, which had to be correctly classiﬁed as
indoor or outdoor to receive the reward (C). fMRI was acquired
during Experiments I and III. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 2.
Legend on pg 1384.
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The experiment consisted of two phases that were per-
formed while the subjects lay in the MRI scanner. fMRI
was applied only during Phase II. In Phase I, the subjects
were familiarized with 192 scene pictures: 96 pictures
were shown twice and 96 pictures were shown four times.
The pictures were presented for 1 s in random order, sepa-
rated by a white ﬁxation cross on gray background for 1 s
(i.e. intertrial interval ¼ 2 s). Half the scenes were indoor
and half were outdoor, and subjects’ task was to distin-
guish them as quickly and accurately as possible using
their index or middle ﬁnger.
Following the design of Experiment I, in Phase II, four 8-
min blocks of a novelty/familiarity-status prediction para-
digm were completed. Here, one of three possible cues (col-
ored squares) appeared for 500 ms, informing the subjects
which two degrees of novelty of picture could potentially
follow. One cue predicted a novel picture (not seen in Phase
I) or a familiar picture (seen twice in Phase I); a second cue
predicted a familiar (seen twice in Phase I) or a highly famil-
iar picture (seen four times in Phase I); and a third cue pre-
dicted a novel picture (not seen in Phase I) or a highly
familiar picture (seen four times in Phase I) (Fig. 1D). As in
Experiment I, 1,625–4,875 ms after the cue one of the two
possible pictures was presented with equal probability
(50:50) followed by a response/ﬁxation period for 3,250–
6,500 ms (Fig. 1E). Using their index or middle ﬁnger the
subjects indicated as quickly and accurately as possible
whether they saw the more novel or the more familiar of the
two possible pictures (the ﬁnger that had to be used to indi-
cate the novelty/familiarity status and the color coding of
the novelty-status cues was counterbalanced across sub-
jects). As in Experiment I, the order of the stimuli and the
timing (intertrial interval and interstimulus interval) in
Phase II were optimized for estimation of event-related
fMRI, allowing the hemodynamic responses for cues and
outcome to be distinguished [Hinrichs et al., 2000].
The scenes presented in Experiments II and III were
carefully prepared. The pictures were gray-scaled and nor-
malized to a mean gray-value of 127 and a standard devia-
tion of 75 (grayscale 8-bit). None of the scenes depicted
human beings or parts of human beings including faces in
the foreground. During Experiments I and III, the stimuli
were projected onto the center of a screen and the subjects
watched them through a mirror system mounted on the
head coil of the fMRI scanner.
fMRI methods
fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra mag-
netic resonance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany)
with echo planar imaging (EPI) using a quadrature trans-
ceiver coil with a design based on the ‘‘birdcage’’ princi-
ple. In the functional session, 25 T2*-weighted images
(EPI-sequence) per volume with blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained (matrix size: 64
  64; 25 oblique axial slices per volume angled at  30  in
the anteroposterior axis; spatial resolution: 3   3   3 mm;
TR ¼ 1,625 ms; TE ¼ 30 ms; z-shimming prepulse gradient
moment of PP ¼ 0 mT*m
 1*ms
 1; positive phase-encoding
polarity), which covered a partial volume of the brain
including the prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex, the basal
forebrain, basal ganglia, the midbrain, temporal lobes, and
the cerebellum (Supporting Information Fig. S5). The fMRI
acquisition protocol was optimized to reduce susceptibil-
ity-induced BOLD sensitivity losses in inferior frontal
regions and temporal lobe regions [Deichmann et al., 2003;
Weiskopf et al., 2006]. For each subject, functional data
were acquired in four scanning sessions containing 326
volumes per session. Six additional volumes per session
were acquired at the beginning of each series and subse-
quently discarded from further analysis to allow for
steady-state magnetization. Anatomical images of each
subject’s entire brain were collected by T1-weighted inver-
sion recovery prepared EPI (IR-EPI) sequences (matrix
size: 64   64; 64 slices; spatial resolution: 3   3   3m m
3),
which were used to improve the spatial normalization of
the partial fMRI volumes. Individual ﬁeld maps were
recorded using a double echo FLASH sequence (matrix
size ¼ 64   64; 64 slices; spatial resolution ¼ 3   3   3
mm
3; gap ¼ 1 mm; short TE ¼ 10 ms; long TE ¼ 12.46 ms;
TR ¼ 1,020 ms) for distortion correction of the acquired
partial EPI images [Weiskopf et al., 2006]. Using the
‘‘FieldMap toolbox’’ [Hutton et al., 2002, 2004], ﬁeld maps
were estimated from the phase difference between the
images acquired at the short and long TE.
Figure 2.
Parametric modulation. In both fMRI experiments, hemodynamic
responses at outcome of reward (left, Experiment I) and novelty
(right, Experiment III) were analyzed using parametric modulation.
The parametric modulators tested expressed ‘‘scaled adaptive cod-
ing,’’ ‘‘absolute coding,’’ and ‘‘linear prediction error.’’ The parametric
modulator of ‘‘adaptive scaling’’ reﬂects a binary response (in other
words a scaled prediction-error signal) to the higher versus lower
of the two possible rewards, or more novel versus more familiar of
images; the parametric modulator for ‘‘absolute value’’ reﬂects
either the absolute value of the reward outcome or the absolute
novelty status of a picture (as deﬁned by the reciprocal of the num-
ber of repetitions); the parametric modulator of a ‘‘linear prediction
error’’ reﬂects the unscaled prediction error responses to reward/
novelty outcomes based on the difference between the received
reward and the mean expected reward as signaled by the cue
(Experiment I), or the difference between the novelty status of the
presented image and the mean expected novelty status as signaled
by the cue (Experiment III; see Materials and Methods). [Color ﬁg-
ure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
r Bunzeck et al. r
r 1384 rThe fMRI data were preprocessed and statistically ana-
lyzed using SPM5 software package (Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London,
United Kingdom) and MATLAB 7 (The MathWorks, Natick,
MA). All functional images were corrected for slice intensity
differences with reference to the middle slice acquired in
time; corrected for motion artifacts by realignment to the
ﬁrst volume; corrected for distortions based on the ﬁeld
map [Hutton et al., 2002]; and corrected for the interaction
of motion and distortion using the ‘‘Unwarp toolbox’’
[Andersson et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2004]. Subsequently,
the partial volumes were spatially normalized to a standard
T1-weighted SPM-template [Ashburner and Friston, 1999]
(care was taken that in particular midbrain regions aligned
with the standard-template). This procedure was done by
warping the subjects’ anatomical IR-EPI to the SPM tem-
plate and applying these parameters to all functional
images. This procedure provides high accuracy of normaliz-
ing partial volume EPIs for several reasons: (1) each individ-
ual IR-EPI is a whole head image with the same spatial
resolution and the same spatial position as each partial vol-
ume EPI-image, (2) in contrast to whole head T1 images IR-
EPIs have almost identical distortions as functional EPIs,
and (3) IR-EPIs have a higher contrast between gray and
white matter as compared to functional EPIs. In a next step,
the normalized partial EPIs were resampled to 2   2   2
mm
3 and smoothed with an isotropic 4 mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian kernel. The time series fMRI data were
high-pass-ﬁltered (cutoff ¼ 128 s), and an AR(1)-model was
used to account for possible serial correlations. For each
subject, a statistical model was computed by applying a ca-
nonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) combined
with time and dispersion derivatives [Friston et al., 1998].
In both Experiments I and III, three regressors were mod-
eled: cue onsets, novelty/reward onsets of correct trials, and
incorrect trials. To capture residual movement-related arti-
facts, six covariates were additionally included (the three
rigid-body translation and three rotations resulting from
realignment) as regressors of no interest. To ﬁt hemodynamic
responses associated with reward/novelty outcomes to dif-
ferent effects, parametric modulation was applied [Buchel
et al., 1998]. Here, on a trial-by-trial basis the regressor of
reward/novelty related outcome activations were multiplied
by (1) the adaptively scaled prediction error, (2) the absolute
value/novelty status, or the (3) unscaled linear prediction
error at each event and then convolved with the canonical
HRF. The parametric modulator ‘‘adaptive scaling’’ (1)
reﬂected a context-independent binary response (1,  1) to the
higher or lower of the two possible rewards, or to the more
novel or more familiar image, respectively; the parametric
modulator ‘‘absolute coding’’ (2) reﬂected the absolute value
of the reward outcome (1, 0.5, 0.15) or the absolute novelty
status of a picture (as deﬁned by the reciprocal of the number
of repetitions; 1, 1/3, 1/5); the parametric modulator ‘‘linear
prediction error’’ (3) reﬂected hemodynamic responses to
reward/novelty outcomes based on the difference between
the received reward and the mean expected reward as sig-
naled by the cue (Experiment I) or the difference between the
novelty status of the presented picture and the mean expected
novelty as signaled by the cue (Experiment III). Thus, in
Experiment I, the cue in Context 1 signaled a mean reward
value of £0.75 [(£1 þ £0.5)/2] and the outcome was associated
with a prediction error of £þ0.25 or £ 0.25; in Context 2, the
cue signaled a mean reward value of £0.325 [(£0.5 þ £0.15)/2]
and the outcome led to a prediction error of £þ0.175 or
£ 0.175; in Context 3, the cue signaled a mean reward value
of £0.575 [(£1 þ £0.15)/2] and the outcome led to a prediction
error of £þ0.425 or £ 0.425. In Experiment III, the cue in Con-
text 1 signaled a mean novelty signal of 2/3 [(1 þ 1/3)/2] and
the outcome was associated with a prediction error of þ1/3
or  1/3; in Context 2, the cue signaled a mean novelty status
of 0.2667 [(1/3 þ 1/5)/2] and the outcome was associated
with a prediction error of þ0.0667 or  0.0667; in Context 3,
the cue signaled a mean novelty status of 0.6 [(1 þ 1/5)/2]
and the outcome led to a prediction error of þ0.4 or  0.4. In
SPM5, each parametric modulator was mean-corrected and
orthogonalized with respect to the ﬁrst parametric modulator
(that means the second parametric modulator was orthogon-
alized with respect to the ﬁrst and the third parametric modu-
lator was orthogonalized with respect to the ﬁrst and second).
Thus, any shared variance between the three regressors was
assigned to the ﬁrst regressor. We started our analysis with
this model to give the ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ regressor
most explanatory power. Additionally, we report a more con-
servative model in which ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ was
entered as the last parametric modulator (following ‘‘linear
prediction error’’ and ‘‘absolute coding").
The speciﬁc effects of each parametric modulator were
tested by entering the parameter estimates (regression coefﬁ-
cients) resulting from each condition (parametric modulator)
and subject (ﬁrst-level analysis) into a second-level random-
effects group analysis using one-way ANOVA (thresholded
at P ¼ 0.005 for both experiments, uncorrected). This also
allowed to extract comparable parameter estimates (ﬁts) for
each parametric modulator. Brain regions showing both
scaled adaptive coding of reward and scaled adaptive cod-
ing of novelty were detected by entering the corresponding
contrast images into between-subject ANOVA and applying
inclusive masking procedures (P ¼ 0.005, uncorrected). Fur-
thermore, for both experiments, a one-way ANOVA was
used to assess the hemodynamic effects associated with cue
processing. Here, two effects are reported: one expressing
the main effect of cue processing and the second expressing
activations associated with the mean expected reward value
(Experiment I) and mean expected novelty status (Experi-
ment III) (thresholded at P ¼ 0.005, uncorrected). This rela-
tively liberal threshold was chosen based on our regionally
speciﬁc a priori hypotheses, which are also expressed in the
acquisition of only a partial volume (covering MTL, mid-
brain, basal ganglia, and frontal cortex; Supporting Informa-
tion Fig. S5). Furthermore, we limited our search (and
reported results) to a priori deﬁned regions of interest
(ROIs), which included bilateral (1) medial temporal lobe
(including hippocampus and rhinal cortex), (2) striatum
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brain (including SN/VTA), (4) OFC, and (5) medial PFC.
The anatomical localization of signiﬁcant activations was
assessed with reference to the standard stereotaxic atlas by
superimposition of the SPM maps on a standard brain
template (Montreal Neurological Institute) provided by
SPM5. To verify the anatomical localization of structures
within the midbrain the activations maps were superim-
posed on a magnetization transfer (MT) template, which
was derived from averaging normalized MT-images of 33
young adults [Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006]. On MT-images,
the SN/VTA region can be distinguished from surround-
ing structures as a white stripe, while the adjacent red nu-
cleus appears dark [Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Bunzeck
et al., 2007]. Note that we prefer to use the term SN/VTA
and consider BOLD activity from the entire SN/VTA com-
plex for several reasons [Duzel et al., 2009]. Unlike early
formulations of the VTA as an anatomical entity, different
dopaminergic projection pathways are dispersed and over-
lapping within the SN/VTA complex. In particular, DA
neurons that project to the limbic regions and regulate
reward-motivated behavior are not conﬁned to the VTA,
but they are distributed also across the SN (pars compacta)
[Gasbarri et al., 1994, 1997; Ikemoto, 2007; Smith and
Kieval, 2000]. Functionally, this is paralleled in the fact
that in humans and primates DA neuron within the SN
and VTA respond to both reward and novelty (see for
instance Ljungberg et al. [1992] or Tobler et al. [2003] for a
depiction of recording sites).
RESULTS
Experiment I
Behaviorally, subjects displayed rapid responding (RT <
900 ms) and high accuracy (d’ > 4.4) (for behavioral
results, see Supporting Information Table S1). We ana-
lyzed neural activity associated with reward outcomes
using parametric modulation [Buchel et al., 1998]. This
approach allows hemodynamic responses to be ﬁtted to
the different parameters of the experiment. Here, we used
three parametric modulators to identify brain regions (1)
expressing an adaptively scaled prediction error response
(adaptive scaling), (2) correlating with the absolute value
of the reward outcome (absolute coding), or (3) respond-
ing according to the unscaled linear prediction error (see
Figure 3.
fMRI results (Experiment I). Hemodynamic responses for reward
outcome expressed scaled adaptive coding in medial temporal
lobes including hippocampus and rhinal cortex (A), bilateral ven-
tral striatum (B), and the medial and orbital prefrontal cortex
(C). Note that parameter estimates reﬂect the ﬁt of the differ-
ent parametric modulators (‘‘scaled adaptive coding,’’ ‘‘absolute
coding,’’ ‘‘linear PE"); within the depicted regions only the regres-
sor for ‘‘scaled adaptive coding" signiﬁcantly explained variance
of the hemodynamic responses (greater than zero, P < 0.05;
error bars denote one standard error of the mean). Further-
more, direct comparison shows signiﬁcant differences between
parametric modulators expressing ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ and
‘‘linear PE’’ or ‘‘absolute coding’’ (P < 0.05, two-tailed). Activa-
tion maps were superimposed on a T1-weighted MNI standard
brain, coordinates are given in MNI space, and color bar indi-
cates T-values. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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sis with this model to give the ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’
regressor most explanatory power.
We found that adaptive scaling of reward was
expressed in bilateral ventral striatum, bilateral MTL
including hippocampus and rhinal cortex, and bilateral
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) including sectors of or-
bital prefrontal cortex (mOFC) (see Fig. 3) (for a full list of
activated brain regions, see Supporting Information Table
S3). Although activity in parts of the mPFC, OFC, and
MTL also correlated with the actual reward level, the lin-
ear prediction error, or both (see Supporting Information
Table S3), it should be noted that the reported activations
for all three parametric modulators were not overlapping
as a result of exclusive masking procedure.
In a second model, ‘‘adaptive scaling’’ was entered as
last parametric modulator (following ‘‘linear prediction
error’’ and ‘‘absolute coding,’’ see Materials and Methods);
this model also revealed activations for ‘‘adaptive scaling’’
of reward in ventral striatum, hippocampus, and prefron-
tal cortex (Supporting Information Fig. S1). The hemody-
namic responses associated with cue processing are
presented as Supporting Information.
The results of Experiment I reveal that components of
the human reward processing circuitry, speciﬁcally the nu-
cleus accumbens, mOFC, and mPFC [O’Doherty, 2004],
show characteristic features of adaptation previously
described in the activity of DA neurons as measured in
nonhuman primates [Tobler et al., 2005]. As for the linear
temporal difference prediction error, only the higher of
two predicted rewards engendered enhanced neural acti-
vation, whilst the lower of the two possible rewards led to
decreased activation (see also Cromwell et al. [2005],
Elliott et al. [2008], Nieuwenhuis et al. [2005], Tremblay
and Schultz [1999], and Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi [2007]).
This pattern suggests that the same reward value (£0.50)
was associated with a hemodynamic decrease in one
context and an increase in another. More importantly, the
magnitude of the hemodynamic response to reward out-
come did not depend on the actual difference between the
mean expected reward and the actual reward (linear
prediction error), but was scaled to remain similar
across contexts. This replicates in humans a previous
ﬁnding from monkeys of a change in gain and sensitivity
during reward processing determined by the range of
likely reward prediction errors [Tobler et al., 2005].
Together, these two ﬁndings provide evidence for scaled
adaptive coding as a mechanism of reward processing
in humans.
The ﬁnding that MTL structures, including both hippo-
campi and rhinal cortex, expressed scaled adaptive proc-
essing to reward outcome (Fig. 3A) extends an observation
that MTL contributes to certain forms of reinforcement
learning [Devenport et al., 1981; Holscher et al., 2003; Plog-
haus et al., 2000; Purves et al., 1995; Rolls and Xiang, 2005;
Tabuchi et al., 2000; Weiner, 2003] and strengthens links
between reinforcement learning and declarative long-term
memory in humans [Adcock et al., 2006; Wittmann et al.,
2005]. On the basis of this ﬁnding, we next tested whether
scaled adaptive processing of reward in MTL would
impact long-term memory encoding of novel information
when presented in conjunction with a reward outcome
(Experiment II).
Experiment II
During encoding, subjects responded quickly and accu-
rately during this task (see Supporting Information Table
S1). Recognition memory analysis was based on both hits
(remember responses and know responses following pic-
tures previously seen during encoding) and false alarms
([FA]: remember or know responses to distracters). Pro-
portions of ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’ responses to novel
and old pictures of each context as well as remember
estimates (Rcorr) and familiarity estimates (Fcorr) are
listed in Supporting Information Table S2. Both Rcorr
and Fcorr were calculated based on a model according to
which recollection and familiarity are independent proc-
esses [Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995]. According to this
model, remember estimates are ‘‘remember-responses’’
corrected for false-alarms and familiarity estimates are
derived by dividing proportions of ‘‘know’’ responses
(corrected for false alarms, Kcorr) by 1   Rcorr [Fcorr ¼
Kcorr/(1   Rcorr)] [Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995]. Rcorr
and Fcorr were submitted to a 3   2   2 ANOVA with
the factors ‘‘reward context’’ (high–medium; medium–
low; high–low), ‘‘relative reward outcomes’’ (higher of
two possible rewards and lower of possible rewards),
and ‘‘recognition memory’’ (Rcorr, Fcorr). This analysis
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘‘relative reward out-
come’’ [F(1,15) ¼ 12.83, P ¼ 0.003] in the absence of any
other main effect or interaction (all P > 0.3). Post hoc
t-test across contexts and Rcorr/Fcorr showed a
Figure 4.
Recognition memory performance 1 day after encoding (Experi-
ment II). The corrected hit-rate (corrected remember estimates
þ corrected familiarity estimates) for novel pictures followed
the pattern of adaptive scaling. Medium reward value (£0.50)
improved learning when it was the higher possible reward com-
pared to when it was the lower possible reward (indicated by
the asterisk, P < 0.05, two-tailed). Error bars denote one stand-
ard error of the mean.
r Adaptive Scaling of Reward and Novelty r
r 1387 rsigniﬁcantly higher memory performance for images that
followed the higher of two possible rewards compared to
images following the lower possible reward (T ¼ 3.6,
P < 0.005). Thus, consistent with our demonstration of
adaptively scaled hemodynamic responses, memory was
signiﬁcantly better for images associated with the higher
of two possible outcomes both for remember and know
responses, an effect that was independent of the actual
value of reward (see Fig. 4). An analysis using Rcorr and
Kcorr revealed similar results, i.e. a main effect of ‘‘rela-
tive reward outcomes’’ (P < 0.005) in the absence of any
other main effects or interactions (P > 0.4).
Experiment III
Although subjects responded more slowly and less accu-
rately than in Experiments I and II, they nevertheless dis-
criminated relatively more novel from relatively more
familiar pictures across all contexts (see Supporting Infor-
mation Table S1 for RTs, hit-rates, FA-rates, and d’-values).
By analogy with Experiment I, we analyzed the hemody-
namic effects of novelty using parametric modulation with
three modulators. The ﬁrst parametric modulator repre-
sented an adaptively scaled prediction error or in other
words a binary response to contextual novelty; the second
parametric modulator represented the absolute novelty
status (as deﬁned by the reciprocal of the number of repe-
titions), and the third parametric modulator represented
the unscaled or linear prediction error (see Fig. 2 and Ma-
terial and Methods). As in Experiment I, we started our
analysis with this model to give the ‘‘scaled adaptive cod-
ing’’ regressor most explanatory power.
An effect of scaled adaptive coding for novelty was
expressed in MTL regions including the hippocampus,
rhinal cortex, prefrontal cortex including orbital parts
(mOFC) (see Fig. 5), and midbrain (including lateral parts
of the SN/VTA, Supporting Information Fig. S3; Support-
ing Information Table S4 for a complete list of activated
regions). As in Experiment I, although absolute novelty
and the linear prediction error were also expressed in
regions including the medial temporal lobe and prefron-
tal cortex (Supporting Information Fig. S4 and Supporting
Information Table S4), it is important to note that the
activation patterns for the three parameters did not over-
lap as a result of exclusive masking procedure. In a sec-
ond model, ‘‘adaptive scaling’’ was entered as last
parametric modulator (following ‘‘linear prediction error’’
and ‘‘absolute coding’’ of novelty); this model also
revealed activations for ‘‘adaptive scaling’’ of novelty in
bilateral hippocampus and orbital prefrontal cortex
(Supporting Information Fig. S1). The hemodynamic
responses associated with cue processing are available as
Supporting Information.
Finally, based on the ﬁrst model, we performed a sec-
ond-level ANOVA for both novelty and reward to identify
common brain regions that expressed scaled adaptive cod-
ing of reward and scaled adaptive coding of novelty.
Commonly activated brain regions were identiﬁed by
using implicit masking (i.e. voxels activated for scaled
adaptive coding of reward were implicitly masked by
those that were activated for scaled adaptive coding of
novelty); this analysis identiﬁed regions within the MTL
including the hippocampus and rhinal cortex and also or-
bital–medial PFC (Fig. 6, Supporting Information Table
S5). In none of these regions did we observe a correlation
between individual d’-values and the ﬁt of the adaptive
scaling model (b-values; P > 0.05). On the other hand, the
contrast for (1) absolute coding of reward and absolute
novelty status, and (2) the linear prediction error of
reward and the linear prediction error of novelty did not
reveal any commonly activated voxels within the a priori
deﬁned brain regions.
DISCUSSION
Our data conﬁrm the hypothesis that, as for reward
magnitude, the neuronal response to novelty is scaled
adaptively as a function of contextual predictions. In par-
ticular, hippocampus, rhinal cortex, and orbital–medial
PFC participated in scaled adaptive coding of both reward
and novelty. This anatomical overlap was notably absent
for signals reporting absolute novelty or the linearly coded
prediction error for novelty (the deviation of stimulus nov-
elty from contextual predictions).
The common participation of these three regions in
adaptive scaling is consistent with the well-established
functional and anatomical connectivity of these regions.
All these regions interact functionally through monosynap-
tic projections from the hippocampus to the medial PFC
and from medial PFC to the rhinal cortex, the main input
and output gateway for the hippocampus [Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Wallis, 2007]. Our data demonstrate that this
network adapts its gain and sensitivity during reward and
novelty processing in a manner that accords with the sta-
tistics of likely prediction errors [Tobler et al., 2005].
Remarkably, this adaptive scaling within the MTL-
mPFC network also translated directly into measurable
effects on long-term memory performance. The ﬁrst two
experiments showed that scaled adaptive processing of
reward was expressed behaviorally in the modulation of
recollection and familiarity, which are processes that are
critically dependent on the integrity of these regions
[Duzel et al., 2001; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Mishkin et al.,
1998; Squire et al., 2004; Yonelinas et al., 2002]. Hence,
memory performance did not reﬂect the activity pattern of
brain regions that represented the unscaled difference
between predicted and actual reward or those reﬂecting
an absolute expression of reward magnitude (Supporting
Information Table S3). This observation supports the idea
that a hippocampal/rhinal contribution to long-term mem-
ory for novel images in Experiment II was also scaled
adaptively according to an overall response to the
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Common areas expressing scaled adaptive coding of reward and
novelty. As identiﬁed by between-subject ANOVA and implicit
masking, overlapping regions within the hippocampus (A),
rhinal cortex (B), and an orbital part of the mPFC (C)
expressed scaled adaptive coding of reward as well as novelty.
Note that parameter estimates reﬂect the ﬁt of the parametric
modulator (‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’). As indicated by the aster-
isk within the depicted regions, only the parametric modulator
expressing ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ signiﬁcantly explained var-
iance of the hemodynamic responses. Error bars denote one
standard error of the mean. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 5.
fMRI results (Experiment III). Hemodynamic responses for nov-
elty outcome expressed scaled adaptive coding within the hippo-
campus (A), rhinal cortex (B), and orbital parts of the mPFC
(C). Parameter estimates reﬂect the ﬁt of the different paramet-
ric modulators (‘‘scaled adaptive coding,’’ ‘‘absolute coding,’’ ‘‘lin-
ear PE"); within the depicted regions, only the regressor for
‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ signiﬁcantly explained variance of the
hemodynamic responses (indicated by asterisk). Direct compari-
son shows signiﬁcant differences between parametric modula-
tors expressing ‘‘scaled adaptive coding’’ and ‘‘linear PE’’ or
‘‘absolute coding’’ (P < 0.05, two-tailed; except ‘‘adaptive scaling’’
vs. ‘‘linear PE’’ in rhinal cortex, P < 0.05, one-tailed). [Color ﬁg-
ure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]preceding reward outcomes (observed in Experiment I).
Our results indicate that adaptively scaled mismatch sig-
nals in the hippocampus and rhinal cortex are privileged
in their control over learning. That means memory
improvement is more closely related to whether rewards
are higher or lower than predicted within a particular con-
text rather than by how much they deviate from
predictions.
Our observation that the hippocampus participates in
adaptive scaling of reward is not entirely unexpected.
Although often overlooked, there is long-standing evi-
dence that the hippocampus contributes to certain forms
of reinforcement learning [Devenport et al., 1981; Holscher
et al., 2003; Ploghaus et al., 2000; Purves et al., 1995; Rolls
and Xiang, 2005; Tabuchi et al., 2000; Weiner, 2003]. For
instance, the rodent hippocampus shows increased activity
in baited but not unbaited maze arms [Holscher et al.,
2003]; in nonhuman primates, it is involved in learning
place reward associations [Rolls and Xiang, 2005]; hippo-
campal activity follows prediction error learning rules for
aversive stimuli in humans [Ploghaus et al., 2000]; and
reward increases synchronization between hippocampus
and nucleus accumbens neurons [Tabuchi et al., 2000].
Furthermore, lesioning the hippocampus impairs contex-
tual forms of latent inhibition [Purves et al., 1995] and
leads to excessive responses or repetitive behavior in
instrumental learning tasks [Devenport et al., 1981]. Our
present results extend these ﬁndings by showing that the
expression of a reward signal within the MTL can be
adaptively scaled with direct impact on reward-related
modiﬁcation of hippocampal learning [Adcock et al., 2006;
Wittmann et al., 2005].
To accomplish adaptive scaling, the hippocampal-rhinal-
OFC network is likely to receive information about actual
magnitudes. In the case of reward, these are likely to
derive from the medial superior frontal gyrus (Supporting
Information Table S3), a ﬁnding that is compatible with
animal studies showing that dorsal portions of PFC are ca-
pable of representing speciﬁc (and therefore probably
absolute) properties of reward [Sakagami and Watanabe,
2007]. In the case of novelty, information about actual
magnitudes is also present within the hippocampus (Sup-
porting Information Fig. S4 and Supporting Information
Table S4). In fact, the intrinsic functional architecture of
the hippocampus may be capable of generating novelty
signals by comparing incoming information in hippocam-
pal subregion CA1 against contextual predictions about
likely events generated in CA3 [Hasselmo and Wyble,
1997; Lisman and Grace, 2005]. Our data suggest that
through its connectivity with the rhinal cortex and the
OFC, this hippocampal architecture also generates adap-
tively scaled novelty responses. Whether or not the hippo-
campus plays a similar role in generating reward
responses is much less clear. The important ﬁnding here is
that MTL-dependent memory formation mirrors the adap-
tively scaled reward signal in the hippocampus and rhinal
cortex (see Fig. 4).
Adaptive coding responses for novelty were adjacent to
absolute coding and linear prediction error responses in
the right hippocampus (Supporting Information Fig. S4).
Such anatomical proximity of qualitatively different
response patterns in the hippocampus has been reported
before. For instance, in a recent study of recognition mem-
ory, adjacent hippocampal regions either responded with
linearly increasing repetition suppression to increasing lev-
els of familiarity or distinguished in a binary fashion novel
from familiar stimuli (irrespective of the level of familiar-
ity) [Johnson et al., 2008]. One converging possibility is
that absolute coding of familiarity strength is a retrieval
process that contributes to recognition memory (discrimi-
nation of old and new items), whereas adaptive coding is
an encoding mechanism that modulates how much is
learned from repeated or novel events [Duzel et al., 2003;
Johnson et al., 2008]. In fact, retrieval and encoding proc-
esses in the MTL are likely to be closely interrelated [Has-
selmo, 2005], and behavioral evidence for this suggestion
is the so-called ‘‘testing’’ phenomenon: this refers to the
observation that the mere retrieval of memories is an efﬁ-
cient mechanism to improve episodic memory [Buckner
et al., 2001; Chan and McDermott, 2007; Karpicke and Roe-
diger, 2008]. The extension that our ﬁndings suggest is
that encoding is not just a mirror image of retrieval proc-
esses, in the sense that familiar stimuli elicit encoding ac-
tivity that decreases proportionally with the repetition
suppression they elicit. Rather, two stimuli that elicit dif-
ferent levels of repetition suppression in the MTL can
engage the same magnitude of MTL encoding responses if
they are similar in their degrees of relative novelty in their
own respective contexts. By this token, adaptive coding of
novelty regulates the likelihood of encoding events with
different levels of novelty by re-expressing their medio-
temporal repetition effects scaled according to contextual
expectations and probabilities. These contextual scaling
mechanisms thus qualitatively extend the ‘‘novelty encod-
ing hypothesis’’ [Tulving et al., 1996].
Although we have approached adaptive scaling of nov-
elty in the context of a mesolimbic mechanism of encod-
ing, there is also a possibility that it contributes to
recognition memory by enhancing the gain of neural
response differences between old and new stimuli. There
is already evidence that qualitatively different neural repe-
tition effects within rhinal cortex, repetition suppression
[Brown and Aggleton, 2001; Brown and Xiang, 1998; Gon-
salves et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Miller and Desi-
mone, 1994; Sauvage et al., 2008], and repetition
enhancement (so-called match enhancement) [Duzel et al.,
2003; Kumaran and Duzel, 2008; Miller and Desimone,
1994; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008] can support recognition
memory. By this token, adaptive scaling could be a result
of repetition enhancement to the more novel of two possi-
ble outcomes and repetition suppression to the less novel
outcome. Electrophysiological recordings in nonhuman
primates suggest that both suppression and enhancement
responses can come early enough (80 ms after the onset of
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even very rapid recognition memory judgments (see also
Bunzeck et al. [2009]). However, this possibility is not sup-
ported by our data because adaptively scaled novelty sig-
nals from the hippocampus and the rhinal cortex were not
correlated with discriminability (d-prime) of old and new
items across participants. Instead, the d-prime values in
the three novelty contexts (0.5, 0.2, and 0.76) paralleled
quite closely the regressor coding the absolute novelty dif-
ference between stimuli in the three contexts (0.5, 0.35,
and 0.8).
As an encoding mechanism, adaptive scaling of novelty
is unlikely to be called into play in all situations in which
novel and familiar information is encountered in the same
context. We observed in an earlier study [Bunzeck and
Duzel, 2006] that when stimuli in a given context can be
treated as single, unrelated, events that do not need evalu-
ation with respect to contextual predictions, and for which
such interstimulus relationships are not goal-relevant, then
veridical (absolute) coding alone dominates. Such a situa-
tion is present when the memory difference between old
and new items can be ignored (is incidental) because task
demands require for instance a semantic decision on each
item (e.g., is this an indoor or an outdoor scene?). In addi-
tion, under such conditions, novelty may even act as a
mechanism to enhance long-term memory for familiar
items [Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Fenker et al., 2008; Li
et al., 2003]. By contrast, when, as in the current study,
assessment, encoding, and retrieval operations go hand in
hand because the encoding of novelty follows an explicit
evaluation of relationships with respect to other stimuli in
the same context, scaled coding mechanisms should come
into play.
It is conceivable that the mesolimbic and mesocortical
structures identiﬁed might be involved whenever adaptive
scaling is necessary for comparisons, and not just in the
case of novelty and reward. However, this seems unlikely,
since these regions of interest were determined based on a
wealth of previous studies that speciﬁcally focused on
novelty and reward processing. In fact, the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) (not scanned in our fMRI studies), for
instance, has been linked with numerical magnitude proc-
essing and comparisons of angles, lines, physical size of
stimuli, and stimulus brightness [Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2005; Fias et al., 2003], which led to the assumption of a
common IPS-based coding mechanism of magnitude and
quantities [Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008; Walsh, 2003].
Although to our knowledge there is no direct evidence
that the IPS expresses adaptively scaled magnitude signals,
it has been suggested that its function in magnitude esti-
mation is strongly linked with underlying response-selec-
tion [Gobel et al., 2004; Walsh, 2003]. An interesting
possibility is that the IPS may link as a general purpose
metric assessment device to mesolimbic and mesocortical
structures, which then compute their contextual adaptive
motivational value. For instance, it is known that the size
of place ﬁelds coded within the hippocampus is depend-
ent on the size of the environment [Ahmed and Mehta,
2009]. If such contextual coding is related to the phenom-
enon we observed here is unclear.
Taken together, our current ﬁndings and earlier observa-
tions [Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006] regarding the magnitude
of novelty signals show a remarkable parallel with nonhu-
man primate studies of reward processing in the SN/VTA
[Tobler et al., 2005]. In the absence of any explicit predic-
tive stimuli, the activation of DA neurons increased with
the reward value of unpredicted liquids, suggesting abso-
lute coding of reward magnitude, whereas explicit predic-
tions about contextual probabilities of rewards led to
adaptively scaled representations of reward magnitude.
Note that our observations regarding adaptive scaling
were outside of the SN/VTA. Although predicted, we did
not obtain convincing evidence that the SN/VTA distin-
guished between adaptive scaling, absolute coding, or a
response reﬂecting a linear prediction error for reward or
novelty (there was an adaptively scaled novelty response
within the midbrain comprising lateral parts of the SN/
VTA complex, which we cannot conﬁdently relate to SN/
VTA; Supporting Information Fig. S3). One reason for this
negative ﬁnding may have been that, as in nonhuman pri-
mates [Tobler et al., 2005], only a proportion of reward
(and novelty) responsive SN/VTA neurons showed adapt-
ive scaling and that these selectively responding neural
populations were spatially too close to each other to be
distinguished with fMRI.
Adaptive scaling is relevant in both highly familiar and
novel environments when comparative novelty among
stimuli is important. In well-known environments, e.g., the
daily route to work, most stimuli are predicted to be
highly familiar. In this case, neural responses to small and
subtle changes to the environment will be adaptively
enhanced, enabling rapid updating of existing knowledge
and helping maintain behavioral ﬂexibility. On the other
hand, in environments that are unknown, e.g. when
exploring a new city, leading to a default prediction of
novel events, adaptive reductions of novelty responses can
ﬁlter out excess information, thereby helping minimize in-
terference. Susceptibility to interference and failure to
update existing knowledge accompany a number of neuro-
logical and psychiatric conditions such as OFC lesions
[Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wallis, 2007], schizophrenia [Ser-
van-Schreiber et al., 1996], and age-related memory dys-
function accompanying minimal cognitive impairment
(MCI) [Della Sala et al., 2005]. As a mechanism that allows
efﬁcient memory updating and ﬁltering out excess infor-
mation, adaptive coding offers a quantitative framework,
which might help provide a better understanding of clini-
cal symptoms and syndromes.
While emphasizing the remarkable anatomical overlap
for the adaptive coding of novelty and reward within hip-
pocampus, rhinal cortex, and OFC, we are not arguing
that novelty and reward are equivalent psychological con-
structs. For example, recent evidence shows that SN/VTA
responses to reward and novelty correlate with different
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ber of brain regions, most notably the nucleus accumbens,
responded differently to novelty and reward. In fact, there
is a subtle, but important difference between the roles sug-
gested for the adaptive scaling of reward and novelty. To
the extent that adaptive scaling of reward prediction errors
constitutes an efﬁcient neural code, we may expect down-
stream mechanisms to invert it in working out how to
adapt predictions of future reward. If this inversion is
imperfect, then the predictions will be incorrect, a fact that
might underlie some anomalies of appetitive choice [Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979]. However, we show directly
that adaptive scaling of reward is not inverted in this way,
such that the encoding of stimuli into memory is indeed
dependent on relative rather than absolute reward. We
have also discussed some ideas as to why adaptive scaling
of novelty might be appropriate. However, this leaves
open the issue as to what happens when novelty itself is
treated as being rewarding, as in exploration bonuses
[Kakade and Dayan, 2002] inspiring increased exploratory
behaviors, an outcome that is critically linked to hippo-
campal integrity [Flicker and Geyer, 1982; Honey et al.,
1998; Knight, 1996; Sokolov, 1963; Vinogradova, 2001].
Here, adaptive scaling would allow the relative allocation
of exploration among better or worse known parts of an
environment to be separated from the absolute question as
to how much to explore as a whole.
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